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Abstract
Moral vitalism refers to a tendency to view good and evil as actual forces that can influence
people and events. The Moral Vitalism Scale had been designed to assess moral vitalism
in a brief survey form. Previous studies established the reliability and validity of the scale in
US-American and Australian samples. In this study, the cross-cultural comparability of the
scale was tested across 28 different cultural groups worldwide through measurement invari-
ance tests. A series of exact invariance tests marginally supported partial metric invariance,
however, an approximate invariance approach provided evidence of partial scalar invari-
ance for a 5-item measure. The established level of measurement invariance allows for
comparisons of latent means across cultures. We conclude that the brief measure of moral
vitalism is invariant across 28 cultures and can be used to estimate levels of moral vitalism
with the same precision across very different cultural settings.
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Introduction
Moral vitalism is a concept that captures how lay people think about and explain morally rele-
vant actions and events in the world [1–2]. It is a lay theory that embraces the dual beliefs that
forces of good and evil (a) actually exist and (b) may cause moral and immoral events to occur.
Moral vitalism acts as a lay theory or heuristic for navigating the complex world of moral
judgement and behavior and is attractive because it provides a convenient explanation for why
good and bad things happen, as well as what makes people good or bad (cf. [3–5]). In order to
measure moral vitalism, Bastian and colleagues [1] developed the Moral Vitalism Scale (MVS).
The MVS had a high predictive validity, showing that those who endorsed moral vitalistic
beliefs tend to worry about being possessed by evil, are more sensitive to being contaminated
through direct or indirect contact with evil people due to the possibility of contagion, and are
more concerned about maintaining their own mental purity. The measure also demonstrated
high reliability across six studies. Based on these findings, it would appear that moral vitalists
view immoral essences—the forces of evil—as having the capacity to “infect” and corrupt peo-
ple’s minds and bodies, either through physical contact or mental content alone. The current
study aims to investigate the degree to which the MVS has similar measurement characteristics
across different cultures, that is, whether its scores can be used in cross-cultural research to
examine relations of moral vitalism with other constructs and to test mean differences in vital-
istic beliefs across cultures.
Moral vitalism
The construct of moral vitalism provides an important avenue through which to examine the
role of spiritual beliefs in moral reasoning and judgement. It goes beyond prior work focused
on how a belief in God may shape thinking and behavior (e.g., [6]) or work focusing on con-
cerns over sanctity or purity (e.g., [7]), by examining a general lay theory about spiritual forces
that is not limited to specific religious commitments or political beliefs. Moral vitalism pro-
vides people with a convenient explanation for why good and bad things happen, as well as
what makes people good or bad. Like other lay theories, moral vitalism may often be largely
implicit and poorly articulated.
By focusing on how people explain their moral worlds, moral vitalism provides an account
of moral cognition which diverges from the view that morality arises from the need to protect
persons, groups, or norms (such as moral foundations theory, see [7]). While it shares some
similarities with accounts that emphasize the role of sense making in the context of harm
(such as the notion of dyadic completion: [8]), it goes beyond such accounts by suggesting that
in efforts to understand their worlds, people often rely on beliefs that have explanatory power.
Beyond completing a moral dyad of victim and perpetrator, moral vitalism serves to explain
why there are victims and perpetrators in the first place. Yet, in contrast to theories focusing
on the moral character of agents (e.g., [9]), moral vitalists see moral action as in part deter-
mined by forces that are independent of people, but which can possess and influence them
(see [1]). Supportive of this, moral vitalism appears to be relatively distinct from a similar con-
struct focusing on pure good and evil published by [10], but which focused on purely good or
evil people, as opposed to purely good or evil forces (see [1]).
In short, moral vitalism provides a filler explanation, or a placeholder concept, for why
morally relevant events occur. As an approach to understanding moral cognition, it suggests
that morality may be as much characterized by a set of beliefs about the nature of the world as
it is by the basis on which people make moral judgements.
As a formal theory, moral vitalism reflects a basic form of cognition (belief) that is likely
universal and probably arose as an explanation for life threatening events, such as disease in
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contexts where other (i.e., more scientific) explanations were not available (see [11]). From
this perspective, moral vitalism is perhaps most closely aligned with the purity dimension of
moral foundations theory, given a similar emphasis on concerns regarding purity and conta-
gion, and links to concerns over biological disease ([7, 12]). As such, moral vitalism is likely to
be evident across a range of cultures, and yet it is also likely to be reinforced within particular
cultural contexts.
The theory and measurement of moral vitalism provides exciting and novel avenues for
cross-cultural research. For example, [11] showed in a cross-national study that historically
higher levels of pathogen prevalence were positively associated with the endorsement of moral
vitalistic beliefs. Other social ecological factors could also be explored, such as the prevalence
and frequency of natural disasters, because they may equally be related to the development of
moral vitalism as a cultural meaning-making belief system. Given that moral vitalism takes
account of the role of spiritual belief within the moral domain by focusing on core underlying
assumptions, rather than specific tenets of religious, cultural or political beliefs, it opens up
new avenues for comparison across culturally diverse populations, and across varying ideolog-
ical and religious commitments. A cross-nationally reliable scale on moral vitalism is able to
provide novel insights into the factors that stimulated the development and preservation of
such beliefs.
Method
The scale
The current version of the MVS features five items assessing the belief in real, agentic forces
of good and evil (e.g., “There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world”) on a
6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree [1]. The item
wordings are presented in Table 1. The scale was translated from English into the respective
languages of countries (see Table 2) by bilinguals. Accuracy of the translation was verified
through back-translations or a committee approach. S1 File include translations of the MVS
into these languages.
Data
A total of 3,202 undergraduate university students residing in 28 countries participated in
this study. Ethical approval for this study was obtained by the last author from the Univer-
sity of Melbourne’s Behavioural and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee, project
no. 2009001486. Informed consent was obtained in line with the requirements of ethical
approval. All other samples in this study were collected in line with relevant ethical proto-
cols and informed consent procedures for each country.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the five items comprising the moral vitalism scale.
Item labels Item wording Pooled sample
means
Standard deviation % missing
existence There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world 3.76 (1.66) .35
responsible Either the forces of good or the forces of evil are responsible for most of the events in the world
today
3.15 (1.62) .26
motivates The forces of good and evil often motivate human behavior 3.62 (1.66) .38
awareness People need to be aware of the good and evil that are in this world today 4.57 (1.37) .42
natural Good and evil are aspects of the natural world 3.87 (1.55) .29
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0233989.t001
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The participants and cultures were sampled on a convenience basis. The central team reached
researchers through professional networks and asked them to collect a sample of 80–100 respon-
dents. Participants responded to a larger questionnaire that included the MVS. Respondents
who took part in the study received non-monetary incentive such as course credits.
The average age of the total sample was 22.6 years (SD = 6.3), ANOVA test showed signifi-
cant differences in age across samples. In Spain, the average age was substantially higher as the
participants were students of an open university, which attracts more mature attendance. Gen-
der composition was also significantly different across samples as indicated by a significant χ2
test. Overall 65% of all participants were female (see Table 2). The data contained less than one
percent of cases with missing values, these were treated with full information maximum likeli-
hood in frequentist models, whereas Bayesian models implicitly incorporated missing values.
Analytical approach
The analysis followed three major steps. At first, we identified a pool of the items that showed
similar factor structure across cultural groups. Second, we ran a series of full and partial exact
Table 2. Sample characteristics and the latent means of moral vitalism estimated by the partial approximate scalar invariance model (sorted by latent mean).
% female� Mean age� Sample size Moral vitalism latent mean Posterior standard deviation Language City
Indonesia 81.0 20.0 100 .32 .37 Indonesian Jakarta
USA 48.0 18.8 100 .16 .43 English College Station, TX
Turkey 87.2 20.8 110 .04 .39 Turkish Istanbul
Japan 13.1 19.7 154 0 0 Japanese Nagoya
Northern Cyprus 43.8 21.3 80 -.34 .42 Turkish Gezelyurt
Hong Kong 78.5 21.3 79 -.42 .39 English Tuen Mun
Singapore 64.0 21.3 86 -.48 .41 English Singapore
China 61.3 20.3 119 -.55 .37 Chinese Guangzhou
Taiwan 51.0 19.6 104 -.63 .40 Chinese Taipei
Mexico 73.0 25.4 100 -1.63 .57 Spanish Cancu´n
UK 77.8 20.4 54 -1.88 .68 English Edinburgh
New Zealand 73.9 19.6 142 -1.88 .52 English Wellington
Venezuela 59.6 20.8 104 -2.22 .64 Spanish Caracas
Israel 73.4 22.9 140 -2.35 .57 Hebrew several
France 63.4 20.9 71 -2.41 .72 French Toulouse
Russia 64.7 20.2 85 -2.47 .68 Russian Moscow
Australia 71.1 20.9 87 -2.50 .71 English Brisbane
Portugal 89.6 21.0 193 -2.62 .57 Portuguese Porto
Poland 47.7 22.8 107 -2.82 .72 Polish Warsaw
Brazil 52.3 22.6 111 -3.14 .75 Brazilian Portuguese Vitoria
Greece 90.5 23.1 101 -3.22 .80 Greek several
Belgium 85.7 18.6 160 -3.26 .71 Dutch Leuven
Norway 49.4 23.4 78 -3.36 .81 Norwegian Oslo
Spain 19.5 36.0 200 -3.88 .82 Spanish several
Switzerland 77.1 23.9 118 -4.05 .86 German Basel
Austria 90.9 24.7 56 -4.13 .93 German Salzburg
Germany 72.3 23.3 103 -5.06 1.03 German Bremen
Finland 77.7 27.8 187 -5.09 1.23 Finnish Helsinki
Total 64.4 22.6 3129
� 26 respondents did not indicate their gender and 34 respondents did not indicate their age.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0233989.t002
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invariance tests. Third, an approximate invariance approach was applied to adjust the model
to the population more closely. At all stages we applied confirmatory factor analysis models
using R package “lavaan” [13] and Mplus version 7.3 software [14]. All the codes with details
of the analyses and the replication data can be found in the S1 File.
A conventional way to assess measurement invariance is to run a series of multiple groups
confirmatory analyses [15]. First, a configural model is fitted to the data. Configural model
does not constrain factor loadings or item intercepts. Second, a metric invariance model is fit
to the data, which is similar to the configural model, but the factor loadings are constrained to
be equal across groups. And finally, a scalar invariance model is fitted, which constrains both
factor loadings and item intercepts. After fitting these three models to the data, they can be
compared using likelihood ratio χ2 test. However, χ2 difference test was shown to be overly
conservative with larger sample sizes [16]. Thus, another set of criteria was suggested: differ-
ences in comparative fit index (CFI) larger than .01 and difference in RMSEA larger than .015
as an indication of substantial differences between models [17]. If a configural model has a
substantially better fit than a metric invariance model, it is preferred over the metric invariance
model. Likewise, if a metric invariance model has a substantially better fit than a scalar invari-
ance model, the former is preferred over the latter.
An important prerequisite to this sequence of model testing is a well-fitting configural
model. As a criterion of an acceptable fit for a factor model we used CFI/TLI > .90, RMSEA <
.08; SRMR< .08 [18]; χ2 was ignored in this analysis due to a large (over 3000) sample. The
model was identified using a marker variable approach (see [19]). After a preliminary analysis,
we decided to use item “existence” as a marker, because it showed highly invariant parameters
across groups when using different model specifications. Switching of a marker variable to the
other items did not affect substantive results.
At the second stage of analysis we tested several partial invariance models. Byrne, Shavel-
son, and Muthe´n [20] proposed the idea of partial invariance, which claims that some of the
loadings/intercepts are allowed to vary without creating a substantial bias. They suggested that
it is sufficient to have two invariant loadings for a partial metric invariance and two invariant
intercepts for a partial scalar invariance. However, the consecutive tests of partial invariance
might lead to an inductive solution which brings a danger of overfitting, that is, a possibility
that the final model may not replicate with different data. For this reason, we were especially
careful in handling model modifications which were not expected by the theory.
The third stage of analysis was based on Bayesian statistics with informative priors. The
prior between-group difference in factor loadings and/or item intercepts was set to zero (no
differences) and its variance was set to a conventionally low value. The between-group vari-
ance in factor loadings and intercepts of the size .01 was considered negligibly small for most
substantive conclusions (it defines the 95% confidence interval of absolute differences in
parameters of .20, see also [21]). Between-group variance in parameters of .10 was considered
large and deviating from the invariance (corresponds to ±.63 difference on a standardized
scale).
First, we tested an approximate configural model, in which the factor loadings and item
intercepts were allowed to vary with a prior between-group variance of .10. Given a well-fitting
configural model, we then set the prior between-group variance to .01 for loadings (approxi-
mate metric invariance) and then for both loadings and intercepts (approximate scalar invari-
ance). In order to evaluate the model fit to the data, two key statistics were examined: 95%
confidence interval for the difference between the observed and the replicated χ2 values (if it
includes zero, it indicates acceptable fit), and related standardized index of posterior predictive
p-value (PPP, which should be higher than .05 with a perfect fit indicated by value of .50). As
long as the sample sizes were relatively small, we expected convergence issues. To ensure
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convergence the models were run using 4 chains and a minimum of 30,000 iterations. All the
models revealed stable solutions indicated by potential scale reduction factor (R-hat), which
was smaller than 1.1 for every parameter. Scanning of trace plots did not reveal issues with
convergence as well. Visual examination of autocorrelation plots detected no substantial prob-
lems with the parameter estimation.
Results
Identifying the pool of items
The MVS initially included eight items: three reverse-coded items and five non-reversed
items. Non-reversed items are listed in Table 1; reversed items were following: “Good and
evil are human constructions”, “Things happen and sometimes they have good or evil conse-
quences, but there is nothing that is truly good or truly evil”, “There is nothing that is really
good or really evil in this world, it’s all a matter of perspective”. A preliminary analysis on the
pooled sample demonstrated acceptable fit of a two-factor model: one factor loaded on all the
reverse-coded items and the other factor loaded on the rest of items [CFI = .964, RMSEA =
.069, SRMR = .045, χ2(df = 19) = 299]. However, applying this model in the multiple group set-
tings was challenging, as in many groups it resulted in a non-positive definite matrix, which
signaled potential problems with the model and the data (such as high multicollinearity com-
bined with small samples). Moreover, running the two-factor model separately in each group
resulted in various model problems across groups.
We concluded that configural invariance across groups could not be detected with the eight
items. Therefore, we dropped the reverse-coded items and examined measurement invariance
for a one-factor model with the five straight-coded items only.
Exact measurement invariance tests
A simple multiple-group factor model with a single factor at the pooled sample showed unac-
ceptable fit as indicated by a high value of RMSEA (.098; the other fit measures were within
the recommended range, CFI = .971, TLI = .942). Modification indices suggested adding a
covariance between items “awareness” and “natural” which improved the model and yielded a
marginally acceptable value of .078 for RMSEA. At the next step, the modification indices sug-
gested to add a covariance between residuals of the items “natural” and “existence” which
makes sense, because both items claim the existence of good and evil forces in a natural world.
The resulting model (Fig 1) had appropriate fit in a multiple-group setting (see model 1 in
Table 3), as well as it fitted to the data from each country separately–p-values of χ2 tests of
model fit were above .01 in every group. Therefore, this model was further used in the invari-
ance testing as a configural model. The alternative model with two factors, one including “exis-
tence”, “natural”, and “responsible”, and the other including “motivates” and “awareness”
showed acceptable fit on the pooled sample but did not converge in multiple-group analysis
(configural model).
Table 3 lists fit indices from a series of the exact measurement invariance tests with multiple
group confirmatory factor analyses. Constraining factor loadings across groups to equality,
that is, testing the metric invariance, decreased CFI by .045 and increased RMSEA by .034,
both values are much greater than the recommended ones. Therefore, we had to select config-
ural invariance model over metric invariance and concluded that there is no full metric
invariance.
Next, we tested partially invariant models. We examined the factor loadings in each group
from the configural model in which they were estimated independently in every group. This
information as well as modification indices indicated that factor loadings of items “existence”
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and “awareness” had the largest differences across groups, so we relaxed these equality con-
straints. Comparing the model fit of the partial metric invariance model (model 4) to the fit of
the configural model revealed a decrease in CFI of .011 and increase in RMSEA of .013, which
almost fell in the recommended range. So, we were able to conditionally accept this partial
metric invariance model. However, when we tested the partial scalar invariance model, the
decrease in CFI and increase in RMSEA were very large (model 5), thus, it was rejected. We
also tried a minimal partial metric invariance model, releasing equality constraints on loadings
of “existence”, “nature”, and “awareness” items, which expectedly showed an acceptable
Fig 1. Measurement model of moral vitalism scale.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0233989.g001
Table 3. Exact measurement invariance tests of the single-factor model of moral vitalism.
Model CFI ΔCFI RMSEA ΔRMSEA SRMR ΔSRMR χ2 Df
Full measurement invariance with 5 items and covariance between “awareness” and “natural” and between “existence” and “natural”
1 Configural .992 .066 .023 124.6 84
2 Metric .947 .045 .113 .047 .101 .078 465.7 192
3 Scalar .810 .137 .172 .059 .150 .048 1286.5 300
4 Partial metric, loadings of “existence” and “awareness” are allowed to vary across groups .982 .011 .079 .013 .056 .033 233.7 138
5 Partial scalar, loadings and intercepts of “existence” and “awareness” are allowed to vary across
groups
.934 .047 .126 .047 .082 .026 532.6 192
6 Partial metric, loadings of “existence”, “awareness” and “natural” are allowed to vary across
groups
.987 .005 .074 .008 .036 .013 178.3 111
7 Partial scalar, loadings and intercepts of “existence”, “awareness” and “natural” are allowed to
vary across groups
.973 .014 .096 .022 .044 .008 279.7 138
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0233989.t003
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decrease in the model fit (model 6) compared to configural invariance model. This model was
then used to test for the partial scalar invariance (model 7), a decrease in CFI was .014, close to
the suggested threshold, but increase in RMSEA was .022, substantially larger than the recom-
mended threshold of .015, and the absolute value of RMSEA of .096 pointed to the model’s
overall poor fit to the data.
The resulting partial metric invariance model is prone to criticism, because, first, the
RMSEA statistic, although technically being under the recommended threshold of .08, had an
upper confidence bound which was beyond this threshold. Moreover, these models had a very
few degrees of freedom, which may imply that the models could have been overfitted, that is,
be applicable only to the current sample. Given the nature of the convenience sample, the
problem of overfitting is especially important issue, so the minimally fitting model might not
be the population model. Due to these concerns, we switched to the approximate measurement
invariance approach [21–22], which in a way avoids the problem of overfitting by allowing
some across-group variance in item intercepts and factor loadings.
Approximate invariance approach
Table 4 lists the model fit statistics of approximate invariance testing. The approximate config-
ural model fits the data very well, showing PPP of .164 and a confidence interval of χ2 includ-
ing zero. The metric model showed a similarly good fit with PPP = .060. The scalar invariance
model showed a deterioration in fit with a PPP dropping below the recommended threshold
of .05 to essentially zero, and BIC increasing compared to the metric and configural models.
Increasing prior variance of the intercepts of the items “natural”, “awareness”, and “responsi-
ble” resulted in a partial approximate scalar invariance model that fitted the data sufficiently
well: PPP of .061 was in the recommended range, χ2 confidence interval included zero and the
increase in BIC was relatively small. We consider this model final and conclude that the mea-
surement model of moral vitalism with five items and two residual covariances (of the items
“natural” with “awareness” and “existence”) is approximately and partially invariant at the sca-
lar level, which implies that the means and regression/correlation coefficients can be compared
across all 28 cultural groups.
The latent means estimated by the partial approximate scalar invariance model are listed in
Table 2. The latent mean had to be fixed to zero in one of the groups, so we randomly chose
Japan. The other means represent differences in moral vitalism compared to Japan. Expect-
edly, Western European countries occupied the lower ranks, while Asian cultures as well as
USA and Cyprus scored the highest on moral vitalism. Previous analyses have shown that
country-level the moral vitalism score correlated robustly with pathogen prevalence, therefore,
Table 4. Model fit indices of approximate invariance tests.
PPP χ2 95 CI
LB
χ2 95 CI
UB
BIC pD
Good fit criteria [23] >.05 Includes zero Small
1 Configural (prior between-group variance of loadings and intercepts is .10) 0.165 -46.5 137.6 39368 380.4
2 Metric (prior between-group variance of loadings is .01, but for intercepts it is .10) 0.074 -25.9 162.6 39412 385.8
3 Scalar invariance (prior between-group variance of loadings and intercepts is .01) 0.001 56.4 247.2 39533 350.8
4 Partial scalar (prior between-group variance of loadings and intercepts is .01, intercept of “natural”, “awareness” and
“responsible” variance set to .10)
0.066 -20.2 166.0 39419 382.9
95 CI LB and 96 CI UB stand for 95% confidence interval, lower bound and upper bound, respectively. pD is estimated number of parameters.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0233989.t004
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underscoring the cross-cultural validity of the scale [11]. Interestingly, the lower levels of
moral vitalism tended to coincide with the larger confidence interval of the estimate.
It is noteworthy that the latent means estimated by different models were highly similar.
For example, the latent means from the exact scalar invariance model (model 3 in Table 3
which showed poor fit) correlated with the means estimated by the approximate partial scalar
invariance model (model 4 in Table 4) at .99.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we aimed at testing a novel scale of moral vitalism across 28 cultural groups. A
model with five items, a single factor and covariance of residuals for three items showed an
acceptable fit. The multiple tests of measurement invariance indicated the lack of exact scalar
as well as full metric invariance. The tests of approximate measurement invariance supported
the presence of partial scalar invariance, where only intercepts of item “natural” were allowed
to vary across groups. This conclusion allowed to correctly estimate latent means: Asian coun-
tries as well USA and Northern Cyprus tended to be high on moral vitalism, while Western
Europeans are less prone to follow this belief.
The results of the analysis demonstrated that MVS can be used to correctly measure moral
vitalism in a wide range of cultures. Moreover, the results suggest that the concept of moral
vitalism has approximately the same meaning across these cultures, whereas in general the lay
theories of good and evil are intertwined with specific religious and cultural beliefs.
The current study has several limitations. First, the convenience sampling of the student
participants may have affected the results, which might be biased towards younger, female,
and educated individuals, rather than reflecting the parameters of the general population.
However, a systematic pattern of latent means found in the study demonstrated that the group
differences do indeed reflect cultural differences in the moral vitalism beliefs. Moreover, the
use of similar samples across national contexts helped to tackle cultural differences while hold-
ing other differences across samples constant.
Another limitation regards the exclusion of reversed-coded items at the preliminary analy-
sis stage. It might have affected the results in a way that the final score and respective latent
means of moral vitalism are likely to also include response tendencies, such as acquiescence
and non-differentiation. It might not be problematic as [1] demonstrated that the measure had
criterion and predictive validity regardless of the lack of balance in item wordings. However,
future research should investigate this issue in depth.
Yet another potential limitation is related to the fact that we detected only a weak evidence
of scalar invariance–that is, the initial model was appended with the two residual covariances
and only two out of five item intercepts were found to be invariant across all the countries
under study. Notwithstanding the differences in model fit, various models tested in the study
estimated highly similar factor means which correlated across countries at .99 or higher. It
indicates that the small differences in item intercepts and factor loadings did not substantively
affect the latent means proving their reliability. It suggests that the poor fit of the exact scalar
invariance model was due to some noise in the data unrelated to the problems of measurement
invariance itself.
Despite these limitations, our results provided evidence of MVS ability to reliably measure
moral vitalism in a wide range of cultures which allows comparison of latent means and corre-
lations/regression coefficients across a wide range of cultures. Establishing the cross-cultural
invariance of moral vitalism opens new lines of inquiry into cultural variability in naïve theo-
ries of spirituality and morality.
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